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RULES, STANDARDS, AND GEEKS
Derek E. Bambauer*
INTRODUCTION
When it comes to regulating technology, the age-old debate between
rules and standards tilts heavily towards standards. Rules, for all their
clarity, are seen as slow-changing tools in industries characterized by
dynamism. They are also viewed as being both under- and over-inclusive,
and in prizing form—one means of achieving a desired result—over
substance—the result itself.1 Moreover, setting legal rules for technology
risks creating lock-in, which may cement a given technology in place. In
short, standards—particularly standards that look to industry best
practices—are lauded as the best means for governing code through law.2
This Article, though, argues that rules are preferable for regulating data
security, at least under certain conditions. In part, this is so because data
security typically focuses on controlling the wrong set of events. Security is
often preoccupied with regulating access to data—in particular, with
preventing unauthorized access.3 Yet, strangely, unauthorized access is
ubiquitous. Employees lose laptops,4 hackers breach corporate databases,5
and information is inadvertently e-mailed6 or posted to the public Internet.7
*
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assistance. Thanks for helpful suggestions and discussion are owed to Miriam Baer, Ted Janger,
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1. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 609 (2009); Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (2007).
2. See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, The Regulation of Inchoate Technologies, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 665,
702 (2010) (stating that “an inchoate technology may provide a better solution than regulation—
perhaps industry-based standards will emerge making legal regulation unnecessary at best and
potentially counterproductive”).
3. See, e.g., STUART MCCLURE, JOEL SCAMBRAY & GEORGE KURTZ, HACKING EXPOSED:
NETWORK SECURITY ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS 135–50 (1999) (discussing hacking Microsoft
Windows credentials).
4. E.g., Kay Lazar, Blue Cross Physicians Warned of Data Breach; Stolen Laptop Had
Doctors’ Tax IDs, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 3, 2009, at B1; Nathan McFeters, Stanford University Data
Breach Leaks Sensitive Information of Approximately 62,000 Employees, ZDNET (June 23, 2008,
9:28 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/stanford-university-data-breach-leaks-sensitiveinformation-of-approximately-62000-employees/1326; Study: Many Employees Undermine Data
Breach Prevention Strategies, INS. J. (Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
national/2009/04/27/99982.htm.
5. Hacker Hits UNC-Chapel Hill Study Data on 236,000 Women, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro,
N.C.), Sept. 25, 2009, http://www.news-record.com/content/2009/09/25/article/hacker_hits_unc_
chapel_hill_study_data.
6. E.g., David Hendricks, KCI Working to Contain Employee Data Breach, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 3, 2010, at C1; Sara Cunningham, Bullitt School Employees’ Social
Security Numbers Mistakenly Released, THE COURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Oct. 21, 2009.
7. E.g., Evan Schuman, Announce a Data Breach And Say It’s No Big Deal?, CBS NEWS,
Apr. 29, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/29/opinion/main6445904.shtml; Elinor
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This Article argues that preventing data breaches is not only the wrong goal
for regulators, it is an impossible one. Complex systems design theory
shows that accidents are inevitable.8 Thus, instead of seeking to prevent
crashes, policymakers should concentrate on enabling us to walk away from
them. The focus should be on airbags, not anti-lock brakes. Regulation
should seek to allow data to “degrade gracefully,” mitigating the harm that
occurs when a breach (inevitably) happens.9
Such regulatory methods are optimally framed as rules under three
conditions. First, minimal compliance—meeting only the letter of the law—
is sufficient to avoid most harm. Second, rules should be relatively
impervious to decay in efficacy over time; technological change, such as
increased CPU speeds, should not immediately undermine a rule’s
preventive impact.10 Furthermore, compliance with a rule should be easy
and inexpensive to evaluate. In addition, rules are likely to be helpful where
error costs from standards are high; where if an entity’s judgment about
data security is wrong, there is significant risk of harm or risk of significant
harm. Finally, this argument has implications for how compliance should be
assessed. When regulation is clear and low-cost, it creates an excellent case
for a per se negligence rule, or, in other words, a regime of strict liability for
failure to comply with the rule. This Article thus addresses not the
desirability of regulation—when data security should be mandated—but
rather how to structure that regulation once it is deemed worthwhile.
The debate about framing legal commands as rules or as standards is a
venerable one. Scholars have addressed the dichotomy in contexts from real
property rights11 to patent law12 to antitrust.13 The merits and shortcomings
of each approach have been analyzed from a variety of theoretical
perspectives.14 Rules offer clearer signals to those whose behavior is
Mills, Hacker Defends Going Public With AT&T’s iPad Data Breach (Q&A), CNET NEWS (June
10, 2010, 4:12 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20007407-245.html.
8. See generally Maxime Gariel & Eric Feron, Graceful Degradation of Air Traffic
Operations: Airspace Sensitivity to Degraded Surveillance Systems, 96 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
IEEE 2028 (2008), available at http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0801/0801.4750v1.pdf
(discussing degraded operations of air transportation systems and conflict resolutions for past and
future system evolutions); see also HOWARD LIPSON, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV. SOFTWARE
ENG’G. INST., EVOLUTIONARY SYSTEMS DESIGN: RECOGNIZING CHANGES IN SECURITY AND
SURVIVABILITY RISKS 1 (2006), available at www.cert.org/archive/pdf/06tn027.pdf.
9. See Gariel & Feron, supra note 8, at 2029–32; see also MARK GRAFF & KENNETH R. VAN
WYK, SECURE CODING: PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES 43 (2003).
10. Intel co-founder Gordon Moore famously observed that the number of transistors on a
CPU doubles every two years. Michael Kanellos, Prospective: Myths of Moore’s Law, CNET
NEWS (June 11, 2003, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/Myths-of-Moores-Law/2010-1071_3-1014
887.html.
11. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 580 (1988).
12. See Duffy, supra note 1, at 611.
13. See Crane, supra note 1, at 52.
14. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995).
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constrained; they help both regulated and regulators assess compliance
more cheaply and easily.15 In addition, they may prevent abuse by
conferring less discretion on regulators.16 However, rules are often underinclusive—failing to cover behavior that should fall within their ambit, or
failing to prevent risks they are designed to address—or over-inclusive—
imposing burdens on unrelated actors or activities.17 Standards, by contrast,
are more readily adapted to complex or changing situations, but often at the
price of predictability and cost.18
The discussion becomes more complex when we recognize that the
distinction is continuous rather than binary. Standards can be rule-like, and
rules standards-like. Consider two security mandates: “encrypt,” and
“follow industry best practice for securing data.” The former looks like a
rule, and the latter like a standard. However, “encrypt” could be seen as a
standard: the command specifies a method, but leaves the implementation
entirely up to the regulated entity. Encryption has been used since the days
of Mary, Queen of Scots;19 its modes range from simple (and simply
cracked) transposition ciphers20 to elliptic curve cryptography.21 Even a
more specific command like “encrypt using asymmetric key cryptography”
can be met with a variety of responses. The RSA, ElGamal, and DSS key
techniques all meet the criterion, but have important differences among
them.22 Thus, a rule can be transformed into a standard by altering the level
of specificity.
Similarly, “follow industry best practice for securing data” could be a
rule. If, for example, the industry has standardized on the use of SSL
(Secure Sockets Layer) to safeguard sensitive data while it is being
communicated over a network, that best practice standard effectively
becomes a rule: “use SSL.”23 Thus, even if an alternative technique were
demonstrated to be functionally equivalent, it would not comply with the
standard, even though standards are typically viewed as ends-driven and not

15. See generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J.
65, 66–71 (1983).
16. See generally Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of
International Cooperation, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 173, 190 (2005).
17. See generally Frederick Schauer, When and How (If At All) Does Law Constrain Official
Action?, 44 GA. L. REV. 769, 781 (2010).
18. See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, Rules, Standards, and the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1287, 1311 (2006).
19. SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK 32–39 (1999).
20. Id. at 7–8.
21. See generally The Case for Elliptic Curve Cryptography, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY,
http://www.nsa.gov/business/programs/elliptic_curve.shtml (last updated Jan. 15, 2009).
22. See generally RICHARD A. MOLLIN, RSA AND PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY 53–78
(Kenneth H. Rosen ed., 2003); Taher Elgamal, A Public Key Cryptosystem and a Signature
Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms, 31 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. THEORY 469 (1985).
23. See generally ERIC RESCORLA, SSL AND TLS: DESIGNING AND BUILDING SECURE
SYSTEMS (2001).
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means-driven. In short, the line between rules and standards blurs,
particularly as a rule’s command becomes more general.
The Article next assesses the conventional wisdom for technological
regulation, which holds that standards are the preferred modality. It then
turns to arguments in favor of using rules instead, under certain defined
conditions. Finally, it closes with observations about the larger role of
technology regulation in the context of data security in the payment system.
I. THE VIRTUES OF STANDARDS
Technology changes quickly; law, slowly. Most commentators favor
standards when dealing with technological regulation of issues such as
security, for at least five reasons.
First, standards allow regulated entities to comply in a more costefficient fashion than rules. Requiring a particular technology or approach
may be unnecessarily expensive, especially where infrastructures differ
significantly, where there are a range of alternatives, or where the endpoint
can be achieved without applying technology in some situations.24 Rules
can limit creativity in achieving regulators’ goals.25
Second, standards can be less vulnerable to obsolescence. Rule-based
specifications may decay quickly when technology changes rapidly. This
either undercuts the efficacy of regulation, or forces frequent updates to it.
The Clipper Chip controversy of the mid-1990s provides a potent example;
regulation that mandated use of one particular encryption technique might
well have undercut the deployment of e-commerce and other advances
dependent on data security.26
Third, standards can minimize the ill-effects of information asymmetry
regarding technology.27 Regulators may not know what technologies are
cutting-edge or appropriate or unnecessarily costly. Standards can wrap in
expertise from regulated entities while meeting regulatory goals.
Fourth, standards may deal better with interoperability concerns. Most
organizations have heterogeneous information technology environments for
a variety of reasons: mergers, legacy systems, customer demands, and so
forth. Regulations that specify a particular technology, or method of
compliance, may make demands that are impossible or inapposite. For
example, Deutsche Bank used the IBM operating system OS/2 long after
24. Cf. Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 179, 202–17 (2008) (discussing shortcomings of network neutrality mandate, versus
multiple network architectures).
25. See generally C. Steven Bradford, The Cost of Regulatory Exemptions, 72 UMKC L. REV.
857, 864–71 (2004).
26. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper
Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709 (1995).
27. Cf. Shubha Ghosh, Decoding and Recoding Natural Monopoly, Deregulation, and
Intellectual Property, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1125, 1161–66 (describing problems of rate regulation
due to information asymmetry for intellectual property).
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most other customers had migrated to Microsoft Windows or a UNIX
platform.28 Thus, requirements tied to Windows (for example, using the
NTFS file system) or to software only available for that operating system
would have forced Deutsche Bank into a costly migration, or to fall out of
compliance. In contrast, a standard that specifies its goal, but is technologyagnostic, allows entities with a range of infrastructures to comply
adequately.
Finally, selecting one technology for regulatory compliance risks
producing market-making effects. Regulation may confer success, or at
least widespread adoption, on a single product or company—a problem that
worsens if the technology is sub-optimal. For example, the memory chip
manufacturer Rambus was able to influence the industry group JEDEC
(Joint Electron Device Engineering Counsel) to adopt, as part of its
standard for SDRAM (Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory),
technology over which Rambus held patent rights.29 (Indeed, Rambus
actually amended its pending patent applications to conform better to the
JEDEC technology.)30 This led to lawsuits against Rambus for fraud, and to
an initial Federal Trade Commission (FTC, or Commission) finding that the
company had engaged in antitrust violations (under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act).31 However, Rambus emerged unscathed from both the suits
and the FTC investigation.32 Similarly, a legal mandate to incorporate a
particular technology could create market power for that technology’s
owner, particularly if the technology were protected by intellectual property
rights such as a patent. Thus, a rule may entrench a single technology into a
powerful if not unassailable market position.
The use of standards in technology regulation is a familiar aspect of the
data payment system in the United States. For example, the FTC imposed
standards-based requirements for the security of non-public information,
known as the Safeguards Rule, as part of its rulemaking authority under the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act.33 The Commission mandates a
“comprehensive information security program that is written in one or more
28. Jonathan Collins, IBM Steps Up to Blame Microsoft for OS/2 Failure, COMPUTERGRAM
INT’L (Nov. 18, 1998), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0CGN/is_3541/ai_53238418.
29. Scott Cameron, Rambus Inc.: FTC Finds That Valid Patent Acquisition Can Amount to a
Violation of Antitrust Laws, IP LAW BLOG (Oct. 20, 2006), http://www.theiplawblog.com/archives
/-patent-law-rambus-inc-ftc-finds-that-valid-patent-acquisition-can-amount-to-a-violation-ofantitrust-laws.html.
30. Id.
31. Edward Iwata, Rambus Stock Soars 24% After Antitrust Ruling by FTC; Royalties Capped,
Not Killed, USA TODAY, Feb. 6, 2007, at B3.
32. Austin Modine, FTC Drops Rambus ‘Patent Ambush’ Claims, CHANNEL REGISTER (May
14, 2009), http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2009/05/14/ftc_drops_rambus_antitrust_case; see
also Dean Wilson, Rambus Sues IBM to Reverse Patent Ruling, TECHEYE (Aug. 24, 2010, 3:21
PM), http://www.techeye.net/business/rambus-sues-ibm-to-reverse-patent-ruling.
33. Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,484 (May 23, 2002)
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 314).
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readily accessible parts and contains administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards that are appropriate to [an organization’s] size and complexity,
the nature and scope of its activities, and the sensitivity of any customer
information at issue.”34 Regulated entities must perform a risk assessment,
and then “[d]esign and implement information safeguards to control the
risks [it] identif[ies] through risk assessment, and regularly test or otherwise
monitor the effectiveness of the safeguards’ key controls, systems, and
procedures.”35 Thus, the GLB Act is a purposive regulatory standard: it sets
goals, and identifies key areas and targets, but is method-agnostic. Financial
institutions can implement its requirements using the technology they think
best fits their infrastructures and businesses. The Commission’s final
rulemaking emphasized that the “standard is highly flexible,” and the notice
repeatedly reassured regulated institutions that its approach was factspecific and contextual.36
Indeed, there are zones of regulatory concern regarding payment data
security where standards appear superior. One example is application
design. As I have written elsewhere, both custom-designed and off-the-shelf
applications in the payment system suffer from security flaws.37 Some of
these bugs result from coding errors; others, from the inherent complexity
of data processing and from interactions between systems and data stores.38
As Microsoft’s Patch Tuesday ritual reminds us, bugs are inevitable.39 They
can be minimized, but not eliminated.40 Thus, as with data losses and
security breaches themselves, the best regulatory goal for application design
is to minimize bugs.41 Software design involves the familiar trade-off
between time and cost versus greater security, with a minimum optimal
bugginess greater than zero.
For application design, then, the critical regulatory issue is
methodology: setting parameters for the design, testing, and deployment of
the software.42 Again, this approach is familiar to the payment industry. The
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) Requirements
and Security Assessment Standards, promulgated by an industry association
founded by payment card networks such as American Express, create

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 36,494.
Id.
Id. at 36,488.
Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming
2010) (manuscript at 8).
38. See generally id. at 8–10.
39. Microsoft
Security
Bulletin
Advance
Notification,
MICROSOFT,
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/advance.mspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).
40. See Bambauer & Day, supra note 37 (manuscript at 8–14).
41. See generally FREDERICK P. BROOKS, JR., THE MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH: ESSAYS ON
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING (3rd prtg. 1979).
42. See generally GLENFORD J. MYERS, THE ART OF SOFTWARE TESTING (2d ed. 2004).
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private law regulation of customer account data.43 To comply with PCI
DSS, an organization must develop its software applications in accordance
with the DSS standards, and with industry best practices. Requirements
include validating application input to prevent buffer overflow and crosssite scripting (CSS) attacks, checking error handling, validating encrypted
storage, validating communications security, and checking role-based
access controls.44 Organizations must implement code review for custom
software before deploying applications.45 Public Web applications are
subject to additional standards, such as developing based on the Open Web
Application Security Project Guide, and protecting against newly
discovered vulnerabilities by using a firewall or vulnerability assessment
tools.46 The goal of these requirements is to prevent breaches from common
attacks, such as the SQL injection attack that caused the data spill at
Heartland Payment Systems.47
PCI DSS, as its moniker suggests, is framed as a standard and not as a
rule. This is clear from its focus on process, such as engaging in code
review, and on goals, such as protecting against new attacks or
vulnerabilities. Thus, for example, PCI DSS requires validating secure
communications, not using a particular secure communications technology
such as SSL.48 Application design is a sensible target for standards-based
regulation, for at least three reasons. First, history matters. Most financial
institutions maintain legacy systems, such as mainframe-based applications,
due to the cost and difficulty of upgrading.49 It may be impossible for them
to employ a given technology to achieve security without expensive
wholesale changes to their infrastructure. Second, systems heterogeneity
means that even applications with a common goal, such as connecting to

43. See generally PCI SCC Data Security Standards Overview, PCI SEC. STANDARD
COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/index.php (last visited Dec.
30, 2010).
44. PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY (PCI) DATA SECURITY
STANDARD: REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES 30–35 (July 2009),
available at https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/pci_dss_download.html
[hereinafter PCI SECURITY PROCEDURES].
45. Id. at 32.
46. Id. at 33.
47. Julia S. Cheney, Heartland Payment Systems: Lessons Learned from a Data Breach 3–5
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Discussion Paper No. 10-1, 2010), available at
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-papers/2010/D2010-January-Heartland-Payment-Systems.pdf; Kim Zetter, TJX Hacker Charged with Heartland,
Hannaford Breaches, WIRED (Aug. 17, 2009, 2:34 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/
08/tjx-hacker-charged-with-heartland.
48. PCI SECURITY PROCEDURES, supra note 44, at 31.
49. See, e.g., Sol E. Solomon, Legacy Systems Still in the Main Frame, ZDNET (Aug. 14,
2008), http://www.zdnetasia.com/legacy-systems-still-in-the-main-frame-62044820.htm; Rusty
Weston, Reconsider the Mainframe, SMART ENTER., http://www.smartenterprisemag.com/articles/
2008winter/markettrends.jhtml (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).
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payment networks, likely must be custom-coded.50 Forcing financial
institutions to use one technology or method to gain security ends would
drive up their costs unnecessarily. Finally, here rule-based specifications
seem more vulnerable to decay. New attacks and vulnerabilities appear
constantly.51 Having a single approach to security across the financial
industry may, like monoculture agriculture, leave institutions vulnerable to
a single new pathogen.52 In short, security may well degrade rapidly, rather
than slowly. For these three reasons—legacy systems, customized code, and
rapid degradation—a standards-based regime is preferable to a rule-based
one for application design.
Regulation by standards rather than rules is the established norm in the
data payment system.53 Indeed, as the discussion of application design
demonstrates, this preference may be sensible in some areas. However,
standards are not always superior. The next section explores the virtues of
regulation by rules for security.
II. THE VIRTUES OF RULES
Arguing for rules in technological regulation is an uphill climb: they
can become obsolete rapidly, may increase costs by forcing entities to
comply in a highly specific fashion, and may be both over- and underinclusive. Yet, this Article argues that rules are preferable to standards
when at least three conditions hold: sufficient minima, slow or low decay,
and inexpensive verification.
First, a rule is helpful when the specified level of data security—
effectively, a minimum—suffices in most or all circumstances. One
example would be to mandate that transmission of data take place over a
connection protected by 128-bit SSL.54 SSL certificates are widely and
cheaply available, and root certificates are built into all major browsers.55
Currently, 128-bit SSL traffic is proof against brute-force decryption
attacks even when adversaries use clusters or supercomputers.56 Thus, 128bit encryption is strong enough to protect data in communication, even if

50. HAZELINE ASUNCION & RICHARD N. TAYLOR, INST. FOR SOFTWARE RESEARCH,
ESTABLISHING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SOFTWARE TRACEABILITY AND DATA PROVENANCE
10 (2007), available at http://www.isr.uci.edu/tech_reports/UCI-ISR-07-9.pdf.
51. See, e.g., SECUNIA, SECUNIA HALF YEAR REPORT (2010), available at http://secunia.com/
gfx/pdf/Secunia_Half_Year_Report_2010.pdf.
52. See generally DANIEL D. CHIRAS, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 116 (8th ed. 2010).
53. See PCI SECURITY PROCEDURES, supra note 44.
54. See, e.g., Roy Schoenberg, Security of Healthcare Information Systems, in CONSUMER
HEALTH INFORMATICS 162, 176 (Deborah Lewis et al., eds., 2005).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., JOSEPH STEINBERG & TIM SPEED, SSL VPN: UNDERSTANDING, EVALUATING,
AND PLANNING SECURE, WEB-BASED REMOTE ACCESS 33–67 (2005).
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institutions do not take additional measures, such as protecting against
eavesdropping.57
A corollary is that rules may be helpful where the impact of a data
breach is high, and where the specified technology raises the cost to an
attacker or discoverer of captured information. One example here is hard
drive encryption. Stories of lost laptops, backup tapes, and USB drives are
legion. Here, rules serve not to prevent loss—indeed, hard drive encryption
is only useful after the loss has taken place—but to reduce its effects.58
Similarly, a rule mandating logging of access to sensitive data cannot
prevent an employee from copying down customer account information
displayed on a computer monitor, but can aid an institution to detect what
has been revealed in the breach, and perhaps to minimize its spread.59 This
condition requires that the rule specify protection that is good enough in
most or all cases.
Second, rules work well when they need not be frequently updated—in
other words, when they decay slowly. This reduces the administrative cost
of the rule, and allows it to retain effectiveness over time.60 128-bit
encryption, for example, will likely suffice against brute-force attacks for at
least ten years, given current rates of advance in CPU clock cycles and
parallelization.61 To take another encryption case study, DES (Data
Encryption Standard) was adopted as a Federal Information Processing
Standard in 1976.62 It remained impervious to commercial-level decryption
(as opposed to governmental attacks) until the late 1990s.63A technology-

57. “Man in the middle” attacks against SSL are still theoretically possible, but financial
institutions (unlike end users) should be sophisticated enough to take steps such as verifying
certificate signatures to safeguard against such hacks. See, e.g., Larry Seltzer, SSL Man-in-theMiddle Attack Exposed, PCMAG.COM (Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,235
5432,00.asp; Ben Laurie, Another Protocol Bites the Dust, LINKS (Nov. 5, 2009, 8:03 AM),
http://www.links.org/?p=780; Dan Goodin, Hacker Pokes New Hole in Secure Sockets Layer,
REGISTER (London) (Feb. 19, 2009, 5:38 GMT), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/02/19/ssl_
busting_demo.
58. Sasha Romanosky, Rahul Telang & Alessandro Acquisti, Do Data Breach Disclosure
Laws Reduce Identity Theft? 12 (Sept. 16, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://weis2008.econinfosec.org/papers/Romanosky.pdf; Robert Vamosi, Protect Data With Onthe-Go Drive Encryption, PCWORLD (Mar. 1, 2010, 9:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/
189034/protect_data_with_onthego_drive_encryption.html.
59. See, e.g., Sarah Cortes, Compliance Fundamentals: Database Logging, Privileged Access
Control, IT COMPLIANCE ADVISOR (Apr. 13, 2009, 3:28 PM), http://itknowledgeexchange.tech
target.com/it-compliance/compliance-fundamentals-database-logging-privileged-access-control.
60. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1012–16.
61. See, e.g., Bradley Mitchell, Encryption: What is the Difference Between 40-bit and 128-bit
Encryption?, ABOUT.COM, http://compnetworking.about.com/od/networksecurityprivacy/l/aa011
303a.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
62. History of Encryption, SANS INSTITUTE, http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/
vpns/history-encryption_730 (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
63. Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, “EFF DES Cracker” Machine Brings
Honesty to Crypto Debate (July 17, 1998), http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Crypto/Crypto_
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specifying rule that remains effective for over twenty years is relatively
low-cost to update and relatively impervious to decay.64
Finally, rules are particularly effective when monitoring is low-cost and
accurate. An ongoing problem with data security breaches is the causation
of downstream harm. For example, if a bank suffers a data spill, and its
customers later suffer identity theft, is there a causal connection to the spill?
Courts have largely interpreted the causation requirements built into tort
law to exempt data owners or storehouses from liability.65 This may result
in insufficient incentives to take precautions. A rule, for example, that
requires data holders to encrypt data usefully serves as a bright-line
negligence test—especially when compliance is relatively low-cost.
Holding institutions responsible for downstream consequences of harms
related to the spilled information provides strong incentives to comply with
the rule—including that liability can be avoided entirely (under the current
doctrine) simply through encryption.66 Concerns about over-deterrence, or
excessive investment in precautions, are minimized (if not eliminated)
where the entity can avoid liability relatively simply and cheaply, and
where errors in adjudication are unlikely. When a rule is effective, both
initially and over time, and where regulators can assess compliance cheaply
and with confidence, a rule is likely to be superior to a standard in
specifying technological measures for data security. Thus, data security
rules can helpfully act as a forcing device that reduces the level of harm
from breaches.
One example of a data security rule that appears beneficial (though it is
sufficiently new that empirical data is lacking) is the data breach
notification scheme added to HIPAA (the federal Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, which set data privacy and
security rules for personally-identifiable health information) by the
HITECH Act of 2009.67 The HITECH Act regulates information security
indirectly: if a covered entity under HIPAA has a breach of “unsecured
protected health information,” that entity must inform people whose data
was released and, in the case of a breach affecting more than 500 people,

misc/DESCracker/HTML/19980716_eff_descracker_pressrel.html. In 1998, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation cracked DES ciphertext in just under three days with commercially-available
technology. Id.
64. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 993–94.
65. See, e.g., Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 176 (3d Cir. 2008);
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming judgment on pleadings for
defendant bank); Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No. 08 Civ. 6060, 2010 WL 2643307,
at *14 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010) (dismissing suit); Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp.
2d 1046, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
66. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 210 (1987).
67. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act of 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 226 (2010).
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must also inform the news media.68 Unsecured protected health information
(PHI) is PHI that is neither encrypted or destroyed.69 Thus, a breach of
encrypted data does not impose a notification requirement, while a breach
of unencrypted PHI does. The HITECH Act is specific about the encryption
technologies that meet its mandate, pointing covered entities to a list of
methods certified by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST).70 Examples of NIST-approved encryption methods include the use
of Transport Layer Security (TLS), SSL, or IPSec for data communications,
and the NTFS file system for data storage.71 The new HIPAA data security
mandate acts like a rule: there is a bright-line test for compliance—either
PHI is encrypted with an approved method, or it is treated as unsecured—
and the consequences of non-compliance are clear—the entity assumes
responsibility for notification in case of a data breach. While the mandate is
a soft one—covered entities need not comply if they are willing to notify if
a breach occurs—it is nonetheless structured as a rule. The HITECH
requirement meets all three conditions specified above. First, encryption is
sufficient to mitigate or prevent most harms; second, the NIST-specified
standards are relatively slow to decay; and third, compliance is easy to
measure—either data is encrypted or it is not.72
Even if a rule risks being under-protective, such as where it decays
relatively quickly in efficacy (potentially violating the second condition
outlined above), it may still be valuable, especially if paired or reinforced
by a standard. This is likely to be true where technological changes are not
rapid enough to call for a standard, but are faster than, for example, the
changes in encryption effectiveness described above. For example, security
regulation could employ a rule specifying encryption with a 256-bit
symmetric key algorithm, and a standard requiring stronger encryption
where industry best practices so indicate. Such a move incorporates both
strict liability—failure to utilize 256-bit or greater encryption creates per se
liability—and negligence-based analysis—failure to use stronger encryption
when one’s industry does so can create liability. This hybrid approach
increases compliance costs, as potentially liable entities must engage in
additional investigation to determine the standard of care, and also

68. Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information, 74 Fed. Reg. 42,740,
42,767–70 (Aug. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R pt 160 and 164).
69. Id. at 42,768.
70. Id.; see Guidance to Render Unsecured Protected Health Information Unusable,
Unreadable, or Indecipherable to Unauthorized Individuals, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/brguidance.
html (last visited Oct. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Guidance to Render Unsecured Protected Health].
71. Guidance to Render Unsecured Protected Health, supra note 70.
72. The difference between cleartext and ciphertext is obvious even to a layperson—one is
readable text and one appears to be gibberish—although the level of encryption used to encode the
ciphertext is not.
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monitoring costs, as enforcers must perform the same task.73 However, it
can usefully augment a bright-line rule where there are significant concerns
that the rule may become under-protective.
This framework suggests, by way of example, three areas where rulebased regulation will be helpful: data storage, data transport, and access
logging.
Both data storage and data transport can be governed by a simple rule:
encrypt. Data encryption technology is ubiquitous, inexpensive, and
reliable, yet the wave of data spills suggests that data owners and
distributors have insufficient incentives to employ it.74 A rule requiring
entities to encrypt data during storage and transport, on pain of facing
liability for all harms resulting from breaches or spills, would usefully
create incentives for protection and would also drive ineffective or
incompetent data handlers from the market. Typical concerns about overdeterrence do not apply where compliance is relatively low-cost and where
errors in evaluating it are rare if not absent entirely. Encryption for storage
and transport meets the three preconditions this Article posits for rules.
First, encrypting data when it is stored or sent should protect against misuse
in most circumstances.75 While sophisticated adversaries can decrypt
protected information, doing so requires time, technology, and resources.
Encryption raises the cost of data misuse, even if it does not affect the
likelihood of data spills. Second, a rule requiring encryption is relatively
obsolescence-proof. While faster GPUs and CPUs are decreasing the time
necessary to decrypt data without authorization, current protocols are likely
to be sufficient for at least ten years.76 Finally, detection is cheap and easy.
Encryption can be verified through visual inspection. Moreover, given that
encryption is strong protection against data misuse, courts might even adopt
a presumption that misused data was, in fact, not protected. Res ipsa
loquitur is a traditional cost-saving enforcement mechanism that could also
helpfully force regulated entities to verify encryption or to enable it by
default.77
Access logging—tracking who has accessed, changed, or deleted
data—is also a strong candidate for rule-based regulation.78 Moreover,
73. See generally W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 121–23 (1991)
(discussing enforcement and information costs).
74. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Private Disordering? Payment Card Fraud Liability Rules, 5
BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COMM. L. 1 (2010); Chronology of Data Breaches: Security Breaches
2005-Present, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach (last
updated Nov. 7, 2010).
75. See supra Part II.
76. Mitchell, supra note 61.
77. See generally THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 63–64 (2004).
78. See, e.g., Logging User Authentication and Accounting Requests, MICROSOFT TECHNET,
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc783783(WS.10).aspx (last updated Jan. 21, 2005)
(discussing
Windows
Server
2003);
Enabling
Access
Logging,
IBM,
http://publib.boulder.ibm.com/infocenter/wchelp/v5r6/index.jsp?topic=/com.ibm.commerce.admin
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access monitoring is an example of a mitigation effort rather than a
prevention effort; recording who has access to data does not impede
copying or misuse directly, but can deter attackers and can also make cleanup efforts easier and more effective.79 A rule for access logging could be
quite specific, mandating that entities capture the user credentials, time of
access or alteration, and location of access or alteration in durable form. In
addition, the rule could allow some flexibility—become more standardlike—by prescribing what must be captured, when, and how, but not by
mandating a particular mode of access control. For example, specifying that
a system of electronic medical records must record what records are
accessed, what changes are made, by whom (user name, for example), from
where (IP address or computer host name, for example), and when, would
provide a clear trail that would enable recovery efforts after a data spill.
Access logging also meets this Article’s three preconditions. Knowing
who—or, at least, whose credentials—accessed the data is helpful to
divining downstream data access after a breach; thus, even minimal
tracking is quite effective.80 Second, access logging has changed relatively
little since the days of mainframe data storage; users still authenticate via
credentials such as names and passwords.81 Even access controls that
employ digital signatures or keys are only variants on this basic technique.
Finally, verifying compliance is straightforward: either the entity keeps logs
of access, or it does not. Protective techniques such as checksums and
hashes can easily test for ex post alteration of access logging, preventing
malefactors from obscuring evidence.82 Thus, not only is access logging
usefully regulated by a rule, but it also serves as an example of a necessary
shift in regulatory focus: from prevention to mitigation.
As these examples demonstrate, regulation by rule has considerable
virtues for technology, at least where the technology has effective minima,
slow decay, and easy verification.
CONCLUSION
The default assumption for regulating information technology is that
standards are not only the superior choice; they are nearly the only choice.
This is because scholars and policymakers have focused on the wrong
.doc/tasks/tseacclog.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (discussing IBM WebSphere Commerce
server); Logging Control In W3C httpd, W3.ORG, http://www.w3.org/Daemon/User/Config/
Logging.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
79. Galen Gruman, “CSI” For the Enterprise?, CIO, Apr. 15, 2006, at 25, 30, 32.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., GARY P. SCHNEIDER, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 493 (8th ed. 2009); Julie
Webber, Software Alone Can’t Protect Your Data, PC Managers Warn, INFOWORLD, Mar. 28,
1988, at S2.
82. Michael Baylon, Using Checksums to Test for Unexpected Database Schema Changes,
MICHAEL BAYLON’S BLOG (Oct. 16, 2010, 3:40 PM), https://michaelbaylon.wordpress.com/
2010/10/16/using-checksums-to-test-for-unexpected-database-schema-changes.
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problem: they seek to prevent data spills, rather than to mitigate their
impact. Rules can helpfully reduce the effects of a breach. For technology,
rules are preferable when they can specify a minimum level of protection
that is relatively effective against most risks or attacks; where obsolescence
occurs slowly; and where monitoring the rule’s implementation is relatively
low-cost and accurate.83 Standards are not always superior, nor are they
always inferior—instead, the preferred embodiment of regulation varies
with the characteristics of the technological problem at issue. While
application design is best governed by standards, due to the critical role of
process, the transport and storage of data, along with identification of
access to information, are best dealt with via rules.84 This Article questions
the prevailing consensus in favor of standards for regulating technology,
and also seeks to create testable predictions about when rules will work
better. In short, I argue sometimes geeks require rules, not standards.

83. See supra Part II.
84. See supra Part II.

